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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the effect of government revenue and the quality of governance on the 
under-five and maternal survival rates. A non-linear panel data study was undertaken using annual 
data for every country in the world. The study’s broad conclusion is that while government 
resources, measured as total revenue received by a country’s government, is essential, the quality 
of governance is even more critical in determining a good outcome for both mother and child.
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I. Introduction
The United Nations third sustainable development 
goal (SDG) target is that the under-five mortality 
rates should be less than 25 per 1000 live births by 
2030, and maternal mortality rates fewer than 70 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. However, 
most low-income countries (LICs) are likely to 
miss this target (The United Nations 2018).
There is a clear relationship between per capita 
income and survival. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) 
used cross-national data for 100 developing coun-
tries in a panel data study to investigate the impact 
of public health spending on child mortality. They 
show that the elasticity of income to child mortality 
is −0.6 but find that the differences between coun-
tries in health spending only explain less than 
0.15% of the mortality differences. They find that 
it would require an increase in public health spend-
ing in the range of 50-100,000 USD to avert one 
child’s death. They do not control for the quality of 
governance, hereafter called governance (Filmer 
and Pritchett 1999). Like Filmer and Pritchett, 
Jamison, Murphy, and Sandbu (2016) and many 
of the empirical studies analysed by O’Hare et al. 
(2013) use a log formulation in a panel data study 
to derive comparable elasticities (O’Hare et al. 
2013; Jamison, Murphy, and Sandbu 2016). Hall 
et al. (2020) also conducted a large panel data 
study, but they found that the double log specifica-
tion was outperformed by a model with 
exponential decay of the effect of government rev-
enue per capita on under-five and maternal mor-
tality (they calculated government revenue per 
capita by multiplying the government revenue as 
a percentage of GDP by GDP per capita in constant 
2010 USD) (Hall et al. 2020).
This paper’s purpose is twofold: first, we con-
sider an alternative non-linear specification based 
on survival rates rather than mortality rates. 
Second, we study the critical question of govern-
ance’s effect on children’s and mothers’ survival. 
We undertake a non-linear unbalanced panel data 
study employing data on 217 countries over the 
period 1960–2020 to investigate this question.
II. Governance
Several researchers have shown the critical influ-
ence of governance on child and maternal survival 
(Dawson 2010; Lin et al. 2014; Li et al. 2018; Ruiz- 
Cantero et al. 2019). Countries with good govern-
ance attract both domestic and foreign investment, 
which drives economic growth. A meta-analysis of 
115 studies found that a one standard deviation 
improvement in corruption is associated with 
a 0.59% increase in per-capita income in low- 
income countries (Ugur and Dasgupta 2011). The 
influence of governance (voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness and the rule of law) on 
the economy acts via multiple pathways, including 
by improving the efficiency of the banking sector 
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(Kamarudin, Sufian, and Md 2016). One aspect of 
governance, corruption, is associated with inferior 
public services, lower rates of attended births, 
lower rates of immunization, and higher child mor-
tality rates (Factor and Kang 2015).
While the relationship between revenue and 
health outcomes and governance and health 
outcomes is clear, we add to the body of 
knowledge by studying the interaction of both 
government revenue and governance on survi-
val. We use a range of governance indicators, 
namely control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, quality of regu-
lation, the rule of law, and the population’s 
ability to have a say in government, voice, 
and accountability. These variables are scaled 
over a range from −2.5 to +2.5, where −2.5 
means extremely poor quality and +2.5 is the 
best1 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; 
Kaufmann and Kraay 2020).
The model
We define our two dependent variables, under-five 
survival rate (mean of 92.3%, a minimum of 58.1% 
and a maximum of 99.8%) and maternal survival 
rate (mean of 99.7%, a minimum of 97.5% and 
a maximum of 99.99%).
A standard linear model or a log-log model 
with constant elasticities would be inappropriate 
for this data. Such a model would suggest 
achieving rates above 100% for a sufficiently 
high government revenue per capita which is 
unacceptable. Therefore, we need a model with 
a broadly defined ‘S’ shape that starts with mini-
mal effects for very low government revenue 
levels per capita and then has a period of rapid 
growth followed by a falling off as saturation is 
reached. Such a relationship is described by 
a broad family of functional forms called sig-
moids, and within this family, the most widely 
used function is the logistic function. First used 
extensively by Verhulst, this approach has found 
applications in many areas, including ecology, 
medicine, chemistry, physics, linguistics, agricul-
ture, and economics. The basic form of the 
logistic function is 
f ðxÞ ¼ M=ð1þ e  αðx  βÞÞ
(1) 
where x is the exogenous variable, M is the max-
imum of the curve and α and β control the steep-
ness and shape of the curve.
This simple function would allow us to model 
government revenue’s effect on our two survival 
variables; however, it would not be possible to 
include our governance measures. Therefore, we 
have adapted the basic logistic function to allow 
a set of exogenous variables (our governance indi-
cators) to change the shape of the logistic curve. 
Finally, we make one further adjustment to the 
model for the maternal survival rate. As noted 
above, the minimum maternal survival rate in our 
data is around 97%. The standard logistic function 
(1) assumes that the relevant minimum is zero. If 
we used this function, the data would then range 
over a tiny part of the specified curve and would 
not capture the non-linearity we expect to find. 
Therefore, we used the generalized logistic func-
tion, which allows the curve to be defined from 
a non-zero minimum. This function is specified as 
f ðxÞ ¼ Minþ ðM   MinÞ=ð1þ e  ððαþχwÞðx  ðβþδwÞÞÞÞ
(2) 
Where Min is the non-zero minimum for the 
dependent variable, which we set at 95%, w is a x 
vector of exogenous variables and χ and δ are 1xk 
vectors of parameters. This allows the shape of the 
logistic curve to vary for each country depending 
on the variables in the w vector (our governance 
indicators).
Our general approach was to enter all the gov-
ernance variables in each equation for our two 
indicators and then move from this general speci-
fication to a simpler one by eliminating any gov-
ernance variables, proving insignificant.
Our final assumption is that we regard equation 
(2) as a long-run relationship (formerly a non- 
linear cointegrating relationship, see Asteriou and 
Hall (2021)); this means that we expect this rela-
tionship to hold over time but not instantaneously 
(Asteriou and Hall 2021). For example, if a low- 
1Full definitions and data sources are supplied in Table 3 in the data appendix
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income country had a sudden increase in govern-
ment revenue per capita, it would not be able to 
instantly deliver the infrastructure necessary to 
obtain a high level of survival immediately but 
would have to build these up over time. This 
implies a process of dynamic adjustment, and we 
model this using the following dynamic adjustment 
equation. 
Yit ¼ Yit  1 þ ϕ1 þ ϕ2ðYit  1   Ŷit  1Þ
þ ϕ3ðYit  1   Yit  2Þ þ εit (3) 
where Yit is one of our two survival indicators in 
country i in period t and Ŷitis the fitted value from 
equation (2) or (3) for that indicator, and εitis 
a standard error term Nð0; σ2Þ.
III. Results
The results of estimating equations (2) and (3) for 
each of the survival indicators are given in Table 1. 
Each column of the table provides the parameters 
set out in equations (2) and (3). Parameters α and β 
are the two basic parameters of the logistic func-
tion. After each of these, we show the governance 
indicators that modify the shape of each country’s 
logistic curve. Overall, both models seem to work 
well and have quite high R2. However, there is no 
clear pattern in the usefulness of the governance 
indicators, although the regulatory quality was 
insignificant in both models for the first set of 
coefficients. The rule of law was unimportant 
entirely in the under-five survival equations. The 
fact that some of the governance indicators are 
significant in every case demonstrates that the 
shape of the logistic curve does indeed vary 
between countries in a significant way. It is not 
possible to interpret these parameters in the usual 
way as elasticities or partial derivatives. They are 
simply parameters which govern the shape of the 
‘S’ shaped curve, that is, how steep it is and where 
the sharp rise occurs. For this reason, we go on 
below to show the actual shapes of the curves for 
some sample countries, which illustrates exactly 
how important both the basic two parameters are 
and the role the governance indicators play in 
varying the shape of the curve in each country.
Table 2 gives the details of the dynamic model 
(equation 3) for both survival rates. The parameter 
that governs the stability of the equation (ϕ2) is, in 
all cases, negative and significant as required. The 
effect of the lagged change (ϕ3) is mostly quite large 
and highly significant. The R2is very high, indicat-
ing a very good fit and the DW statistic clearly 
shows no sign of serial correlation in the errors. 
As we would expect, these results suggest that it 
takes several years to adjust these indicators to their 
equilibrium value after a change in government 
revenue per capita.
The shape of the curves and the importance of 
governance
The estimates presented above seem reasonably 
satisfactory, but it is hard to get a clear under-
standing of the dynamics from these estimates. 
This is because we have many countries, and 
every country will be different, and space con-
straints make it impossible to show each 







χ Control of corruption - 0.000481(6.9)
Political stability −0.00003(2.4) −0.00025(7.1)
Regulatory quality - -








δ Control of corruption 295.8(3.6) 854.4(10.1)
Political stability −218.9(2.1) −328.2(10.1)
Regulatory quality −307.1(4.0) −193.5(6.1)












‘t’ statistics in parenthesis
Table 2. The dynamic models.






No of countries 151 145
observations 2313 1767
‘t’ statistics in parenthesis
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country’s behaviour individually. To help under-
stand both the importance of the governance 
effects and per capita government revenue, we 
conduct a simple set of experiments. We begin 
by setting all the governance indicators to −2.5, 
which is their worst value possible. We then 
calculate the long-run relationship between rev-
enue and the two survival indicators. We then 
reset all the governance indicators to zero, the 
mid-point of the range, and we again calculate 
the relationship between per capita government 
revenue and each indicator. We then graph each 
pair of relationships to see both the effect of an 
improvement in governance and the effect of 
revenue.
Figure 1 shows the graphs for this experiment 
for each of the indicators. In both cases, the move 
from extremely poor governance to a neutral qual-
ity of governance dramatically affects the survival 
indicator, especially at very low per capita revenue 
levels. Consider the under-five survival rate: at 
a per capita government revenue level of 1000, 
USD the low level of governance curve achieves 
only slightly over 86% survival, while with neutral 
governance, the same level of income achieves 
approximately 97% survival. Once per capita gov-
ernment revenue reaches 5000 USD per year, the 
two curves largely converge, and governance makes 
little difference to the survival rate. A similar pic-
ture is shown for maternal survival rates. For a low 
level of per capita government revenue of 1000, 
USD the poor governance curve achieves only 
92% maternal survival, while a neutral level of 
governance achieves over 98% survival. Again, for 
per capita revenues over 5000, USD the two curves 
coincide, and governance makes little difference. 
These findings emphasize the importance of good 
governance for survival rates in the case of low- 
income countries.
IV. Conclusions
We find that increased government revenue is 
associated with an increase in both child and 
maternal survival rates. For low-income countries, 
this effect is dominated by the effect of improving 
the quality of governance. When government rev-
enue reaches a level of around 5000 USD per 
capita, governance becomes much less critical. 
This modelling offers the ability to model the 
impact of a change in government revenue in the 
individual country while accounting for govern-
ance. As such, it is a valuable addition to the 
armoury of those who advocate for reduced cor-
ruption and increased government revenue.
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Figure 1. The effect of governance and per capita revenue on maternal and child survival.
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Under-five survival rate; We take the under-five mortality 
rate per 1000 live births (U5m) from ***, and the survival rate 
(U5S) is defined as 
U5S ¼ 100   ðU5m=1000Þ � 100 
Maternal survival rate; we take maternal mortality rate per 
100,000 live births (MMR) from ***, and the maternal survival 
rate (MMS) is defined as 
MMS ¼ 100   ðMMR=100000Þ � 100 
Governance indicators
Worldwide Governance Indicators
The WGI reports aggregate and individual governance indi-
cators for over 200 countries and territories over 1996–2019 
for six governance dimensions (see Table 3). These are com-
posite indicators based on more than thirty data sources. 
Firstly, individual questions from the underlying sources are 
assigned to one of the aggregate indicators. The compilers 
then rescale the data to make it comparable across sources 
using the unobserved components model. The resulting com-
posite measures are in units of a standard normal distribution 
with mean zero, running from −2.5 to +2.5 and higher values 
corresponding to better governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2010; Kaufmann and Kraay 2020).
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Table 3. Definitions of dimensions of governance.
Governance 
dimensions What it captures
Control of corruption Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests
Government 
effectiveness
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies
Political stability Perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism
Regulatory quality Perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development
Rule of law Perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
Voice and 
accountability
Perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media
Source (Kaufmann and Kraay 2020). ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’. 2020.
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